What It Means To Lose Chad Clifton

That really surprised me; how long he seemed to be holding the ball. You’re right, he doesn’t continuously play in 7-man protection. Odom was collapsing the pocket so quickly that it was even enough time for the extra blockers to break downfield as a checkdown option. I wonder if the extra blockers were too slow in reacting; taking too long going from blocker to receiver.

I expect he’ll be going up against Chris Long who, unfortunately, reminds me a little of Antwan Odom. Hopefully his foot is feeling better and that should help him.

by tackles. It also prevents the defender from getting into them, where the tackle can be more easily controlled. Tackles use their arms to keep the defender away and take up more space. Their goal is to cut the defender off from the QB while they are dropping back and forming a pocket. The punch is one technique that can be used to disrupt the defender’s momentum, and some tackles are better at it than others. Obviously, strength is an asset in this technique.

Interior linemen, by contrast, make contact and try to control the defender. They aren’t trying to form a pocket, they are trying to hold an area. A punch is less effective on huge defensive tackles, as they rely more on leverage and applied strength.

I don’t remember Clifton’s punch being anything noteworthy, but Tauscher’s was pretty impressive. I haven’t watched Barbre enough to see his; his biggest problem is footwork, anyway. Same with Colledge. Last week, Colledge was winning the initial battle, but losing on second effort because the defender was getting into him. He was also sliding too wide. He knows that, because he commented about it yesterday. LG and LT involve very different mindsets, in pass protection.

None of this has anything to do with the zone blocking scheme, by the way. That’s run blocking, which is a whole different set of techniques.

were shocked at how the line fell apart when they shifted Colledge to LT. They have done it before, and it wasn’t a complete disaster. This time, though, it seemed like the Bengals were playing with 12. After Colledge gave up that first pressure and looked completely lost, the whole line started a death spiral. It seemed like they all got really tight, and it only got worse every time they turned around and saw their QB lying on the grass. I hope they — and the staff — learned something from the experience.

We don’t know the run/pass options that were called, and checked out of because of defensive alignment. The Packers have a lot of those plays, so the lack of run attempts might be on Rodgers as well. He was looking pretty shocked himself, so it is plausible that he was trying to pass his way out of the hole he was in.

Credit the Bengals defense for seeing blood in the water and helping the Packers meltdown. Once they saw the pass pro was breaking down, they deliberately gave the Packers mostly pass looks in the early downs. They crowded the box and dared the Packers to pass. The Packers took the bait, Rodgers ended up on the ground, and the drives stalled. By 3rd down, the Packers were not in run-favorable situations. That equals one run attempt after Clifton went out.

You’d like to think that the coaching staff would be able to realize what was happening and adapt during the half. It just doesn’t work that way, though. Maybe if the injury happened before the half, they could have discussed changes in the game plan at halftime. However, I doubt it. If pass protection goes down the tubes during the game, that team is going to lose almost every time. You need a working pass game to give running plays a chance.